This is an extraordinary time to be talking about defence and security. So much is changing. The rapid pace of global technological change, and the volatile and ambiguous geo-political context are transforming the character of conflict. Mass, precision, pace, survivability, and lethality remain crucial aspects however they are now increasingly delivered through advanced technological combinations. At the conclusion of the NATO Conference and six months after President Trump’s inauguration, this is a good time for us at NORTAC Defence to share our insights and impressions drawing on our collective experience and contemporary conversations. In this first article we offer nine significant strategic shifts expected to define the defence landscape for years.
Key Strategic Shifts
1. Return to State-Based Threats. We are eleven years since the Russian annexation of Crimea and four years since the withdrawal from Afghanistan. We have transitioned from an era focused on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremist organisations to one dominated by state-based threats. This marks a generational shift in defence priorities and the end of the ‘Defence dividend’. It is clear Russia poses the principal geographical threat to NATO (less the United States), while China presents the pacing technical threat. This will endure for at least the next two decades.
2. Defence Budget Commitments. NATO nations have committed to increasing defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, accepting that 1.5% of this can be attributed to ‘security infrastructure’. In the short-term both Canada and the UK have committed to real term increases in the next 24 months with Canada moving quickest to recover from its lower baseline spend. Money will not be the resource which constrains Defence.
3. The real resource constraints. Conversely despite defence budgets rising, the pressure on resources like personnel and time will further intensify. For Canada and the UK achieving superior outcomes swiftly with fewer personnel must drive increased adoption of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence technologies. As Ukraine shows, saving and preserving scarce human resource and delivering mass through cheap uncrewed systems is a pre-requisite of future warfare.
4. NATO Integration. The multi domain operations philosophy at the heart of the NATO Strategic Concept requires a return to a more disciplined approach to standardisation across maritime, air, land, space, and cyber domains. The renewed emphasis by both Canada and the UK on NATO-first policies underscores the need for enhanced interoperability and more strategic independence from the US. Demonstrating interoperability quickly is critical to the alliance and deterrence.
5. Reasserting National Resilience. To address increasing resilience demands, learn the lessons from Ukraine and meet NATO Article 3 commitments, requires a whole-of-society approach to national security. This will include the competence to mobilise and train reserves rapidly and the ability to integrate civilian logistics infrastructure into military frameworks. Creating the technical and physical infrastructure will take time but is, like interoperability, core to deterrence.
6. Democratisation of Warfare. Emerging technologies increasingly blur the boundaries between military and civilian domains in large-scale warfare. In Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine, for example, iPhone-enabled sensing networks provided valuable human intelligence, while Ukraine’s “garage culture” rapidly produces drones to maintain the tactical advantage. Many can now access sophisticated targeting and precision strike capabilities once reserved for leading nation states. To harness this power, defence organisations must adapt doctrine, training, and organisational structures, and apply technology deliberately to gain the decision advantage necessary to compete in ever-shortening sensor-decider-effector cycles.
7. Asymmetry of Cost. The Ukraine conflict is re-teaching Kipling’s lesson of a ‘10-rupee Jezail’. The sinking of the Black Sea Fleet and Operation Spiders Web emphasise the vulnerability of ‘capital assets’ to deception, surprise and sophisticated sabotage. The Houthi operations in the Red Sea are conducted for a fraction of the cost of the US defensive umbrella. However, the recent US bombing of Iran demonstrates the power of exquisite expensive technology and the reach it provides. Finding the right balance in all domains will be a decade long challenge.
8. Taking a ‘War’ DevOps Approach. Defence must adapt better to the accelerating pace of technological change and shift from a waterfall approach to an ‘agile’ mindset. Both UK and Canada are actively adopting the ‘War Dev Ops’ that Ukraine are pioneering by creating frameworks that foster iteration, innovation and integration. Central to this transformation is the cultivation of a risk-permissive culture, the introduction of more flexible financing options, and the expansion of access to data and end users. These measures enable companies to receive rapid feedback and drive innovation directly at the operational edge. With the right permissions and policy support, the UK and Canadian Brigades stationed in Estonia and Latvia, along with the NATO Allied Reaction Force Concept, offer ideal vehicles for implementing a more dynamic approach.
9. Cyber and the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EM) as the Integrating Domain. To manoeuvre in the physical domains of Maritime, Land and Air a combined Integrated Force must dominate the Cyber and EM domain and possess a digital backbone unhindered by legacy systems, technical obsolescence, limited data-sharing capabilities across security domains, and with an overarching technical architecture to ensure coherence. Future operations, ranging from competition to warfighting, will occur within a contested electromagnetic spectrum. This must be planned for, protected against and mitigated with an emphasis on redundancy and maintaining data flows.